Contestable Demographic Reasoning Regarding Labour Mobility and Migration by Knežević Hočevar, Duška & Cukut Krilić, Sanja
131
D V E  D O M O V I N I  •  T W O  H O M E L A N D S  •  5 0  •  2 0 1 9
CONTESTABLE DEMOGRAPHIC REASONING REGARDING  
LABOUR MOBILITY AND MIGRATION 
Duška KNEŽEVIĆ HOČEVAR|, Sanja CUKUT KRILIĆ||
COBISS 1.02
ABSTRACT
Contestable Demographic Reasoning Regarding Labour Mobility and Migration
The essay provides a review of contestable demographic reasoning applied in rela-
tion to migration and mobility, in which the notion of the national population as a 
closed and bounded system still persists. Although free movement of people has 
been enshrined as one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, their 
mobility within it remains selective and curtailed in various ways. Drawing on selec-
ted studies of labour mobility and migration within the European Union, the authors 
argue that labour mobility and migration policies continue to categorise people as 
either more or less entitled to move across the European Union’s internal borders.
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Delovna mobilnost in migracije v vprašljivem demografskem umovanju
Besedilo ponuja pregled vprašljivega demografskega umovanja migracij in mobilno-
sti, ki še vedno vztraja pri ideji nacionalnega prebivalstva kot zaprtega in zamejenega 
sistema. Čeprav je svobodno gibanje ljudi med temeljnimi načeli Evropske unije, je 
njihova mobilnost selektivna in na različne načine omejena. Na podlagi izbranih raz-
iskav delovne mobilnosti in delovnih migracij v Evropski uniji avtorici potrjujeta, da 
delovne mobilnosti in migracije politike še vedno razporejajo kot bolj ali manj upravi-
čene do gibanja čez meje nacionalnih držav Evropske unije. 
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INTRODUCTION
The recent concerned and disharmonious responses of European governments 
to the “refugee crisis” and the extensive migration and mobility in ageing Europe 
have reinvigorated the persistent appeal of political demographers that it is no 
longer possible to separate population policies from much wider considerations 
of the political implications of national identities, nationalisms and international af-
fairs (Teitelbaum, Winter 1998). It seems that political messages are time and again 
grounded in reiterated demographic dystopias about reproductively more vital for-
eigners or foreign-born people who are supposedly responsible for the vanishing 
of the values, way of life, social position and even the culture of the less-reproduc-
tive domestic population. Such dystopias address and entrap mobile individuals 
and labour migrants as well, who as a rule are recognised by official statistics as 
foreign-born newcomers or as short-term transients, and are not registered in the 
population count at all.
This article discusses labour mobility and migration within socio-political dis-
courses that address the persistent fear of the “proper composition” of national pop-
ulations. The article refers to discussions about the perceived threatening compo-
sitional change to the “more familiar faces of Europe’s nations” (Kligman 2005: 253) 
brought by the increasing mobility and migration of certain populations within the 
European Union (EU). 
Drawing on a secondary analysis of selected studies on labour mobility within 
the EU, the authors argue that migration and mobility within the EU borders are 
still being controlled and managed in ways that categorise mobile people and mi-
grants as either more or less legitimate and desirable in their crossing of the EU’s 
internal borders. 
In the first part, the article explores the demographic reasoning which refers 
to “empirically proven” demographic change moving in the direction of a radical 
transformation of the ethnic composition of Western Europe by below-replacement 
fertility and the emigration of the domestic population on the one hand, and the 
increasing immigration of people of various ethnic and racial backgrounds on the 
other. This issue is further discussed by presenting attempts to study the political 
consequences of such population dynamics in order to (dis)prove such concerns. 
To better understand such demographic dystopias, the authors look at the central 
concept of demography – the (national) population, and the history of its imagining.
In the second part, the practices and explanations of demographic processes are 
discussed through selected examples of labour mobility within the EU. Confronting 
the ideology of free movement across the EU’s internal borders, the authors discuss 
the legitimacy of different categories of mobile individuals, and how it is understood 
by policymakers and the public. In the final part of the article, the reader will learn 
whether mobile individuals are valued through the notions of an open or closed 
system of national population.
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CONTESTABLE DEMOGRAPHIC REASONING
Fear of a “Transformed Composition” of the Population 
In 2013, a workshop entitled “Population: The Long View” was held at St. John’s Col-
lege in Oxford in order to discuss current, large-scale and long-term interdiscipli-
nary population issues. The editors of the 2015 special issue of the journal Population 
Studies, David Coleman, Stuart Basten and Francesco C. Billari (Coleman et al. 2015), 
all well-recognized demographers, believed that recent demographic research had 
mostly focused on micro-level population analyses despite the impression that me-
dia and politics were dedicating more attention to macro-level population changes. 
These include unfavourable ratios between population and resources, rapid popu-
lation growth in poorer countries and population ageing in richer ones, population 
decline in some countries and large-scale international migration in others, and pop-
ulation movements due to climate change.
The editors regretted that the invited authors did not pay more attention to the 
issue of migration (ibid.: S7). However, the reason for this might lie in a very sensi-
tive discussion of the long-term consequences of population processes in Western 
Europe commenced by one of the editors, David Coleman, a decade ago (2006). In 
his article Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third De-
mographic Transition (2006), Coleman argued that in the last five decades in some 
industrial countries,1 there was evidence for and empirical proof of altered ethnic 
composition through persistent below-replacement fertility of domestic popula-
tions, high levels of immigrants of remote geographical origins or with different 
ethnic and racial ancestry, and increasing emigration of domestic populations. Ac-
cording to Coleman, such demographic change – a precursor of a third demograph-
ic transition towards a radically transformed ethnic composition of Western Europe 
– should raise anxiety about several potential political consequences which had 
been de-emphasized by social science until now. Critical of the prevailing asym-
metrical discussions, which as a rule highlighted the human rights of immigrants 
only, while labelling domestic protests against them racist and xenophobic, Cole-
man (2006: 427) strove for a “more balanced” debate without excluding those who 
warned against long-term consequences of the transformed and changing ethnic 
composition of European populations.
Coleman’s concern about the under-communicated political and social implica-
tions of the current demographic changes can be recognised in the works of the 
forerunners of political demography as a research field. Myron Weiner, the founder 
of the concept of political demography, warned against “difficult dimensions” of mi-
gration already in the early 1970s. Conducting fieldwork in selected places in India 
1 Coleman’s calculations and population projections were applied to the USA and seven Euro-
pean countries: Austria, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.
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on the costs and benefits of migration for the local inhabitants, he pointed out the 
dilemma: “How to find a way in which local people belonging to one ethnic commu-
nity could obtain greater equality in the employment market without at the same 
time restricting the opportunities of migrants and their descendants belonging to 
other ethnic groups […]” (Weiner in Weiner, Teitelbaum 2001: vi). 
Until his death in the late 1990s, Weiner devoted his career to investigating the 
political implications of large-scale population changes, i.e. issues that should be ad-
dressed by political demography. The newly proposed field of study referred mainly 
to the active responses of governments, their policies and the public to population 
change brought by fertility, mortality and (labour) migration. Yet this subject, that 
addressed so explicitly the relationship between politics and demography, did not 
attract the interest of political scientists even three decades after Weiner had de-
fined the research area. Weiner ascribed this neglect to their poor knowledge of 
demographic theory, methods, and concepts, or their general viewpoint that de-
mography was largely an atheoretical discipline, focused on the measurement of 
population size, composition and territorial distribution and detailed studies on fer-
tility, mortality and territorial movement (ibid.).
Even now, when political scientists have finally recognised political demogra-
phy as a significant research field,2 Jack A. Goldstone explained that political scien-
tists were uninterested in demography probably because demography evolved as 
a highly specialized and technical field of knowledge, requiring advanced mathe-
matics and the analysis of enormous amounts of data necessary for studies of de-
mographic change. The author believed that mutual collaboration between the two 
disciplines was inevitable since demographers usually cannot explain how people 
and social institutions would react to demographic changes (Goldstone 2012).
Ignorance of the History of Population Theory
If demographers and political scientists, in their common project, strive for a mutual-
ly informed discipline of political demography in order to avoid misunderstanding 
the political implications of population change, it is necessary to look into the history 
of demography as a science (Demeny 1988; Hodgson 1991; Kreager 1993, 1997, 2008, 
2009, 2015; Szreter 1993; Kertzer, Fricke 1997; Melegh 2006) in order to make it easier 
to understand the current demographic dystopias which usually serve as a guide 
for population policymakers. For instance, Coleman’s concern about the changed 
composition of Western Europe can be more easily understood if we draw on the 
history of imagining the national population – the basic concept of contemporary 
demo graphy. In his article Population Theory – A Long View (2015), Philip Kreager 
2 The authors refer to the recently published collection of essays entitled Political Demography: 
How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics (2012).
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re-emphasized3 that demography had been in service of the state since the eight-
eenth century when the notion of population was defined anew. Contrary to ancient 
European empires and states of diverse aristocratic elites, in which the ethnic or reli-
gious affiliation of the population was secondary to the people’s loyalty and produc-
tivity, the newly defined (national) population consisted of people with a common 
linguistic, cultural, and historical background, with associated material conditions 
such as residence in a common territory and shared descent. Compared to theories 
of government in ancient regimes, which put forward a mechanism of maintaining a 
balance and peace between sub-populations, modern nation-states became gradu-
ally seen as responsible for counting “all” the people with national statistical offices. 
The general idea of the population in ancient and early modern states did not ad-
dress all the people as full citizens, but only a minority – usually adult male proper-
ty-owners who belonged to various competing clans or factions (Kreager 2015).
An important novelty of the newly-defined population was the idea that popu-
lation was not only a historical and cultural phenomenon but a natural one as well. 
Imagined organic ties to people’s territory and environment were considered as peo-
ple’s natural rights to such places, and such “natural wholes” had to be “home-pro-
duced” (Kreager 1997: 156). Population was viewed as a closed-bounded system: a 
state boundary cut a population off from other populations across a boundary, and 
the boundary introduced an epistemological closure as a precondition for the de-
mographic ideal of complete enumeration and records of its membership (ibid.).
This type of static understanding of a national population still underlies de-
mographic reasoning about the population composition, including Coleman’s re-
flection on the third demographic transition. Yet drawing on human agency – the 
perspective that explains individuals’ creative and contestable management of 
collective identities and their making – the line of reasoning which understands a 
population as a homogenous unit of passive carriers of culture, can be at least ques-
tioned. Therefore, Kreager insisted that questions of how a population was defined 
for demographic research, and how collective identities were defined in a classifica-
tory and mensurational exercise, should be central in applied demography, because 
such questions predetermined demographic reasoning about the composition of an 
observed population. Or, as Kreager himself puts it: 
The fact that people may report their ethnic, religious, and other identities differ-
ently from one census to the next and may tailor birth, marital, occupational, and 
migration histories to suit currently preferred statuses, is significant not only as a 
potential source of bias affecting the analysis of trends but as evidence of the active 
adjustment of population composition and structure to changing circumstances. 
(Kreager 1997: 148)
3 Kreager has explained the idea of the national population in detail in previously published 
works; see e.g. Kreager 1997.
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Finally, in demography it is common to view fertility, mortality and migration as con-
stituents of the structure and composition of the observed population. Yet collecting 
data on migration compared to births and deaths has proved to be more demanding, 
since migration movements have only recently been introduced into the historical 
model of explanation of the first demographic transition (Van de Kaa 1999).4 
Bringing migration into both explanatory models of historical demographic tran-
sitions, from high fertility and mortality rates to low levels, Van de Kaa showed that 
in the period of the first demographic transition, when the European populations 
were increasingly settling in “new worlds”, Europe was predominantly an emigration 
region.5 Van de Kaa (2002) also believed that migration in Europe played a signifi-
cant role between and after the two world wars, and when European countries were 
faced with massive movements of refugees and displaced persons, returning prison-
ers and others, when Europe experienced a temporary “revenge of history” during 
the de-colonization process. Moreover, he attributed a real shift of migration, this 
time as more permanent immigration to Europe, to the introduction of guest-worker 
programmes in the 1960s, when the governments of Western and Northern Europe 
tried to solve shortages of unskilled labour.
Yet the considerable immigration of guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, emi-
gration from Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and political 
asylum seekers from all over the world in the early 1990s, coincided with the record-
ed below-replacement fertility levels in European countries. Based on calculations 
showing that during the second demographic transition between 1965 and 1999 
the majority of Western and Northern European countries registered population 
growth due to immigration, Van de Kaa (1999) assumed that Europe would turn 
from an emigrant to an immigrant region. He further believed that in the case of 
a temporary period of below-replacement fertility and continuing immigration, 
Europe would as so many times in the past adapt and act as an immigration area 
with a carefully controlled influx, while in the case of a lengthy period of below-re-
placement fertility and rapid ageing of the population it was immigration that 
would shape the demographic future of Europe. Yet Van de Kaa did not refer to 
just any kind of immigration. He explicitly advocated selected immigration if the 
immigrants were seen as a solution to the failed European self-reproduction: “Long-
term considerations lead to the conclusion that the quality of immigrants and their 
willingness and ability to integrate are important for the viability and continuity of 
European civilization” (ibid.: 40).
4 In demography, the “first demographic transition” is used synonymously for so-called modern 
demographic behaviour denoted in the historical record as voluntarily limited marital fertility.
5 If demographers identified the first demographic transition through the available statistical 
evidence in the period of the radical fertility drop between 1850 and 1950 in nearly 700 Eu-
ropean provinces (Friedlander et al. 1999), Van de Kaa set the start of the second demograp-
hic transition in 1965, when the majority of European countries first registered persistent 
sub-replacement fertility (Van de Kaa 1987).
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LABOUR MOBILITY AND MIGRATION BETWEEN IDEAS OF  
OPEN AND CLOSED POPULATION SYSTEMS
Limits to the Freedom of Movement Principle
There is a discrepancy between the actual practices of the migrant-receiving coun-
tries that are more in line with the above presented idea of the national population 
as a closed system, and the idea of free movement of people enshrined in founding 
documents of the EU, such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
For instance, freedom of movement beyond the boundaries of national populations, 
introduced as one of the EU’s fundamental freedoms, has been recognised in the 
Single European Act as a necessary element for the creation of the European com-
mon market (Kmak 2015). In its 2013 Communication on Free Movement, the Euro-
pean Commission announced that 
the free movement of workers has positive effects on economies and labour mar-
kets. The four fundamental freedoms, which are inextricably linked, create the con-
ditions for more efficient allocation of resources within the EU. Free movement of 
EU citizens stimulates economic growth by enabling people to travel, study and 
work across borders and by allowing employers to recruit from a larger talent pool. 
In view of the significant imbalances in Europe’s labour markets and its declining 
working-age population, labour mobility contributes to addressing skills and job 
mismatches. (European Commission 2013: 2) 
The recent lifting of obstacles for citizens of the EU Member States to seek employ-
ment in another EU country notwithstanding, citizens still face numerous difficul-
ties when moving between different EU countries. It is generally agreed that the EU 
needs to further develop its policies to exploit its “mobility potential” (CEPS 2014). 
Yet labour mobility within the EU is still a limited phenomenon. According to the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Euro-
peans are not very much in favour of looking for a job abroad (Eurofound 2014). Van 
Houtum and Van Der Welde (2004) described this trend as “immobility” of the labour 
force, observing an overestimation of the potential mobility of the labour force in 
most studies on the issue. 
Particularly in the last decade, there have been extensive discussions about the 
limits of the freedom of movement principle. Referring to increasing controls and 
management of mobility/migration, Favell (2008: 705) talked about a “new European 
migration system”. Moreover, after the most recent enlargements of the EU (in 2004, 
2007 and lastly in 2013), most of the “old” Member States have striven to counter-
act the expected “invasion” of the cheaper labour force from the “new” European 
Member States by imposing several transitional restrictions to entry to the labour 
Contestable Demographic Reasoning Regarding Labour Mobility and Migration
138
D V E  D O M O V I N I  •  T W O  H O M E L A N D S  •  5 0  •  2 0 1 9
market in the forms of quotas and work permits. Despite attempts to facilitate the 
freedom of labour and movement in the internal EU market, Pijpers (2009) assessed 
the labour market entry policies in the “old” member states as largely restrictive in 
the first years after the enlargement. Needless to say, specialised labour market in-
termediaries, subcontractors and legal advisory firms profited from the transitional 
border closing through the application of all kinds of circumvention strategies in 
order to recruit scarce low-skilled labour from the new Member States (Pijpers 2007). 
Similar recent examples of violation of labour legislation on posted work have 
demonstrated that the lifting of transitional restrictions in labour market access to 
citizens of new EU Member States has not resulted in a cessation of such violations. 
To illustrate, although 
the posting of workers in principle contributes to balancing the demand and supply 
of services in the EU and provides valuable economic opportunities for companies 
and workers, it also exposes the deeply rooted tensions between promoting the free 
movement of goods, capital, services and labour on the one hand, and maintaining 
the European social model and established industrial relations, including industrial 
action to protect collective interests, on the other. (Vah Jevšnik, Rogelja 2018: 24)
While freedom of movement remains one of the most celebrated, practical and 
visible rights of the EU integration, as it also decreases the gaps and mismatches 
between skills and needs of the labour market in ageing societies and thus redu-
ces sectoral labour shortages, limits remain to the implementation of this principle 
throughout the EU and to the exercise of the associated social rights. Despite the 
proclaimed common ideology of economic integration at the EU level, the Member 
States insist on keeping their respective welfare state systems under their own con-
trol (Barslund, Busse 2016).
Labour Mobility and Social Rights
The “discretionary power” of the nation-states can also be seen in the granting of 
social rights to mobile individuals. Ciupijus (2011) argued that the processes of Eu-
ropean integration could provide grounds for a more denationalised notion of citi-
zenship, the so-called European citizenship. In practice, however, the Member States 
still make the right to residence conditional on active employment or the citizens’ 
possession of medical insurance in their respective countries. Moreover, the social 
rights afforded to mobile EU citizens are generally lower compared those afforded 
to citizens (Ciupijus 2011; Lafleur, Mescoli 2018). 
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At the policy level, the Citizenship Directive6 has explicitly limited the mobility 
rights of EU citizens who have resided in an EU resident state for less than five years. 
Lafleur and Mescoli (2018: 483) even observed that workers, former workers who 
actively sought employment and persons who were not economically self-sufficient 
could lose their right of residence if they became an “unreasonable burden on the 
social system” of the host country. 
It seems that arguments in favour of increased mobility were to a certain extent 
overshadowed by a general fear among the populations of most of the “old” Mem-
ber States that too many workers from Eastern Europe were moving to the West 
primarily in search of generous welfare benefits (Ciupijus 2011; Roberts 2015; Lafleur, 
Mescoli 2018). The assumption behind such fears was that some categories of immi-
grants/mobile citizens were abusing the welfare system of the “host” societies to a 
higher degree than the others. It was perceived that they were threatening the very 
foundations of the European welfare states. Such was the statement of the UK Home 
Secretary in 2004 that despite positive effects of migration from the new member 
states, accession nationals were welcome to the UK only to work but not to claim 
benefits. A further intention was to restrict benefit entitlement (Roberts 2015). 
Yet a study by the European Commission on this subject found little evidence of 
“benefit tourism” in Europe and contradicted claims by the governments in the UK, 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands that EU social security systems were under 
strain, especially from Romanian and Bulgarian migrants (ICF GHK 2013). The study 
further showed that non-active EU migrants made up a very small share of the total 
population in each Member State. Also, on average, EU migrants were more likely 
to be employed than nationals living in the same country. Finally, the study showed 
that the vast majority of non-active EU migrants (79%) lived in economically active 
households, with only a minority of them living with other household members out 
of work (ICF GHK 2013).
In relation to the issue of supposed “welfare tourism” in the new EU Member 
States, Kmak (2015) found that the European Commission puts a strong emphasis on 
the work-oriented mobility of EU citizens and on the improvement of their personal 
lives, as well as reinvigoration of the EU economy. This assumption, in her view, sug-
gested that EU citizens were subjectivised as “economic men”, rational and mobile 
individuals willing to travel to other countries in order to find remuneration best 
reflecting their skills. It is worth mentioning that the Commission’s emphasis on the 
significant prevalence of work-orientated mobility was followed by the information 
that only a small number of mobile EU citizens were economically inactive. Kmak 
(2015: 400) observed that “the Commission perceives EU citizens not only as rational 
6 Directive 2004/58/EC of the the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely with-
in the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/
EEC,90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (Official Journal of the European Union L 158 of 30 April 2004). 
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but also as moral individuals, whose mobility is guided by work rather than the wish 
to be idle and to benefit from social assistance of receiving states”. A similar message 
is conveyed through the talk about lifestyle, amenity and/or retirement migrants 
who are welcome only conditionally – when possessing sufficient economic means 
for living (Dwyer, Papadimitrou 2004).
Finally, Lafleur and Mescoli (2018: 481) believe that “with the economic and fi-
nancial crisis, welfare policies are increasingly being turned into instruments for 
limiting the mobility of EU migrants”. They further argue that restrictions to the 
“mobility of the poor” are mirrored in debates about migration selectivity, ground-
ed in the perceived economic contribution of both non-EU as well as EU migrants. 
However, in these debates, not only the economic worth of individual migrants, 
but also ethnicised notions about the proper composition of national populations, 
come to the forefront.
Ethnicity Matters in Labour Mobility
The utilitaristic stance that migrants are needed to fill up labour shortages in se-
lected sectors seems problematic in several ways. Gill (2009) demonstrated that the 
exploitation of migrants as a labour force that would fill up sectoral deficiencies in 
“native” labour markets without enabling them access to an array of social, economic 
and political rights was one of the perils of a conservative approach to the policy of 
unlimited migration. In this sense, the author also saw the attitude of proponents of 
the policy of open borders that the economic benefits of increased migration out-
weighed its costs as problematic. In an effort to disprove the argument that migrants 
would take away citizens’ jobs, decrease their wage levels and/or overburden the 
national welfare systems, Gill noted the danger of entering into the discussion of 
“worth” and “legitimate” migration (ibid.). The same applies to programmes for man-
aging migration/mobility, limiting/enabling access to the labour markets, favourable 
treatment for admission, and programmes designed to match labour supply with 
demand (Kyrieri 2007), which are a standard element of most nation-states’ migra-
tion/mobility policies. Policies and discussions that recognise the “value” of mobile/
migrant workers for the respective national economies also seem to convey the mes-
sage that certain “kinds” of migrants are more valuable than others. There is a dis-
crepancy between the desirable “migrant elites” and the migrant labour force that 
is perceived as needed by the policymakers and the general public (Zavratnik 2011). 
The utilitarian understanding of migration is usually amplified with “arguments” 
about cultural differences and similarities that supposedly affect the possibility and 
level of migrant integration into a society. The chances of foreigners being allowed 
to play a role in a given society are seen as higher when they are perceived as be-
ing “easy to integrate”. As Fox et al. (2012) showed in their analysis of the media in 
the UK, when covering the migration of East Europeans (particularly Hungarians and 
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Romanians) into the UK, the media invoked cultural difference as the basis for exclu-
sion, and constructed cultural traits as a basis for differentiation. The authors found 
that the “Roma frame” in the media was freely applied to individuals who would 
not necessarily define themselves as Roma, in particular Romanians. In government 
policy discourses, on the other hand, “assumptions about shared whiteness operate 
as implicit criteria for racialized inclusion: East Europeans are desirable because they 
conform to the racialized understandings of Europeanness” (ibid.: 691). 
In this view, Favell (2008) insisted that East European migrants from “new” Mem-
ber States were increasingly filling the jobs considered as 3D (dirty, dangerous and 
dull) due to their perceived ethnic “similarity” and cultural “proximity” in comparison 
to the previously preferred “non-white” and “non-European” people. Favell also ar-
gued that an internal and regional labour market was increasingly developing. On 
the other hand, l’affaire des Roms, in which almost 1,000 Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals of Roma origin living in France were expelled from the country in 2010 due 
to their supposed inability to sustain themselves economically and their “criminali-
ty” (Carrera, Faure Atger 2010; Lafleur, Mescoli 2018) remains a pertinent example of 
undermining the notion of free movement within the EU and of the ethnicisation of 
the Roma as “illegitimate” mobile individuals. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current European picture of parallel trends of large-scale international migration, 
below-replacement fertility and ageing population is a demographic reality which 
as a rule stirs up fears and concerns of a vanishing European civilisation. The neglect-
ed field of the intertwined relationship between politics and population changes is 
often filled with rhetoric of exaggeration and garbled interpretations by politicians 
and journalists, who usually misunderstand and misuse demographic calculations 
and long-term population projections, or manipulate them in line with their political 
interests (Teitelbaum 2004, 2015).
However, such fears are also embedded in the demographic reasoning of em-
pirically-based evidence of membership of nation-state population units, which as 
a rule serves as a guide for population policymakers. Neglecting questions of who 
or what is counted how, when and in what circumstances they are counted and how 
collective identities are defined renders demographic reasoning in line with the 
anachronistic idea of a national population as a closed system with a “proper com-
position”, where “the prime consideration is once again not the number of people 
but their ‘quality’” (Melegh 2006: 72) 
Such primordial notions about the proper composition of the national popu-
lations are also continuously present in the discussions about movement of peo-
ple within the EU borders. Intra-European movement, as observed by Van Ostaijen 
(2016), was classified by the European Commission as mobility and not as migration 
Contestable Demographic Reasoning Regarding Labour Mobility and Migration
142
D V E  D O M O V I N I  •  T W O  H O M E L A N D S  •  5 0  •  2 0 1 9
due to the historical construction of the EU as a single or internal market. Despite the 
EU’s commitment to the free movement of people as a means of further European 
integration, various mechanisms, such as transitional restrictions of entry to the EU 
labour markets, sectoral quotas, programmes to match labour supply with demand, 
the conditioning of residence upon the principle of sufficient economic means and 
the limiting of welfare state assistance to economically inactive individuals, curtail 
the free movement of individuals across the EU. Furthermore, in these discussions, 
cultural traits are constructed as a basis for differentiation and social exclusion of 
particular social groups. Therefore, it is not surprising that Lafleur and Mescoli (2018) 
even prefer to use the terms “EU migrants” over “mobile EU citizens” to reflect the 
precariousness of their status, which many individuals from EU countries share with 
third country nationals.
Whether and how to reconcile the apparently contradictory ideology of free 
movement within the EU, the “need for” migrants in ageing and low-fertility EU so-
cieties and the still prevailing demographic reasoning about the maintenance of a 
“proper composition of the population” remains a challenge for scientific reasoning 
beyond the closed system of national populations. 
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POVZETEK 
DELOVNA MOBILNOST IN MIGRACIJE V VPRAŠLJIVEM 
DEMOGRAFSKEM UMOVANJU
Duška KNEŽEVIĆ HOČEVAR, Sanja CUKUT KRILIĆ
Besedilo ponuja pregled vprašljivega demografskega umovanja migracij in mobilno-
sti, ki še vedno vztraja pri ideji nacionalnega prebivalstva kot zaprtega in zamejene ga 
sistema s »primerno sestavo« svojega prebivalstva. Nedavni zaskrbljeni in neusklajeni 
odzivi evropskih vlad na »begunsko krizo« in obsežne migracije v starajočo se Evropo 
so ponovno oživili demografske distopične predstave o reproduktivno bolj vitalnih 
tujcih oziroma v tujini rojenih ljudeh, ki domnevno ogrožajo obstoječe vrednote, na-
čin življenja, družbeni položaj in celo kulturo manj reproduktivnega domačega pre-
bivalstva. To problematiko besedilo sprva presoja s predstavitvijo poskusov preuče-
vanja političnih posledic tovrstnih prebivalstvenih gibanj, da bi se potrdilo ali ovrglo 
strahove in zaskrbljenosti glede spremenjene prebivalstvene sestave. Za boljše ra-
zumevanje nastalih demografskih distopij besedilo naslavlja središčni demografski 
koncept (nacionalnega) prebivalstva in zgodovino njegovega oblikovanja.
V nadaljevanju besedilo presoja tovrstne demografske predstave, ki implicitno 
naslavljajo in zajemajo tudi mobilne posameznike in posameznice ter delovne mi-
grante in migrantke, ki jih uradne statistike praviloma označujejo kot v tujini rojene 
ljudi ali jih kot kratkoročno priseljene posameznike in posameznice v statističnem 
štetju nacionalnega prebivalstva sploh ne registrirajo. Čeprav je svobodno gibanje 
ljudi med temeljnimi načeli Evropske unije, avtorici zatrjujeta, da je njihova mobilnost 
v njej selektivna in na različne načine omejena. Na podlagi izbranih raziskav delovne 
mobilnosti in delovnih migracij v Evropski uniji avtorici potrjujeta, da delovne mobil-
nosti in migracije politike nadzirajo in upravljajo s pomočjo mehanizmov, ki ljudi še 
naprej razporejajo kot bolj ali manj upravičene do gibanja čez meje nacionalnih držav 
Evropske unije. Med mehanizmi vzdrževanja želene družbenoekonomske sestave 
prebivalstva avtorici presojata prehodne omejitve vstopa na trge dela držav članic, 
sektorske kvote, programe za usklajevanje ponudbe na trgu dela z njegovimi potre-
bami, pogojevanje pravice do bivanja z zadostnimi ekonomskimi sredstvi in omeje-
vanje pomoči države blaginje ekonomsko neaktivnim ljudem. Obenem pokažeta, da 
ti mehanizmi naslavljajo tudi bolj ali manj podobne ali oddaljene kulturne značilnosti 
priseljencev in priseljenk kot podlago za razlikovanje in družbeno izključevanje do-
ločenih družbenih skupin. Ali in kako uskladiti protislovje med ideologijo prostega 
gibanja ljudi v Evropski uniji, »potrebo po« migrantih in migrantkah v starajočih druž-
bah s prevladujočimi trendi nizke rodnosti ter še vedno prevladujočim demografskim 
umovanjem o vzdrževanju »primerne prebivalstvene sestave«, ostajata dilema in iz-
ziv za znanstveni pogled onkraj zaprtega sistema nacionalnega prebivalstva.
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